INTRODUCTION
WE TEST WHETHER a sequential equilibrium model of reputation formation in an incomplete information repeated game predicts behavior of players in an experiment. After subjects have experience their play is roughly like the sequential equilibrium, except they seem to have a "homemade" belief about the prior probability of the other players' payoff type, in addition to the prior probability we created in the experiments.
The mathematical analysis of reputations in repeated games with incomplete information is one of the most fertile areas of current research in mathematical social science (see Wilson's 1985 review) . These games assume incomplete information about players' "types" (privately known characteristics). The common belief about a player's type is the player's reputation. In such games, modellers usually search for "sequential equilibria" (SE; Kreps and Wilson, 1982a)-equilibria in which play is rational in every subgame of play from any point to the end (as in "subgame perfect" equilibria; Selten, 1975) . In SE, beliefs about players' types are updated based on play before each subgame, using Bayes' rule when possible.
In many games, reputations seem to form even though complete-information theories (assuming perfection) predict otherwise-players cooperate in the finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, for instance (Kreps, et al., 1982; cf. Axelrod, 1982) , and firms deter entry (Kreps and Wilson, 1982b ; Milgrom and Roberts, 1 Thanks to James Friedman, Charles Holt, David Kreps, Robert Wilson, two anonymous referees, and participants at the 1986 Public Choice Society Meetings, the 1986 Summer Econometric Society Meetings, the University of Iowa, New York University, and the Wharton Decision Processes bag lunch seminar, for comments. This research was funded by the New York University Center for Entrepreneurial Studies. know more 8-period sequences lie ahead. We would like to have the players see enough repetitions of the entire 8-period game to be able to learn a sophisticated equilibrium concept, while regarding each 8-period game as separate. To avoid this problem, we used pools of E and B subjects. Three E subjects sat in a room together, with one experimenter, and the eight B subjects sat in another room with a second experimenter. Before each sequence, we used pre-determined random numbers to choose which of the three E subjects would play that sequence, and this number was not announced to the B subjects. Similarly, in each sequence a random pre-generated order of the same B subjects was used, and that order was not known by the E subjects. In theory, this randomness made it difficult for either side to develop any stable reputation other than that we deliberately seeded through the X-and Y-type payoffs (as we show in Section 4.5.3 below).
After the experimenters read the instructions (see Appendix B) aloud to both E and B subjects, the B subjects stayed together in one room, and the E subjects went to an adjoining room. The experimenters communicated with each other and with the subjects in each room by walkie-talkie, to restrict communication so that subjects could not identify their partners by voice.5
COMPETING HYPOTHESES

The Sequential Equilibrium Prediction
We will sketch the derivation of SE for the parameters in experiments 3-5, starting with the last (8th) period first. SE play must be an equilibrium in every possible subgame. In subgames along the equilibrium path, players are assumed to use Bayes' rule to update their information about others based on observed play. In subgames off the equilibrium path, an SE must specify how players will update their beliefs (since Bayes' rule will usually not apply), and in these cases the SE is somewhat arbitrary. We solve for an SE by beginning in the last period, and calculate optimal play (including updating of beliefs) in the last period as a function of beliefs entering that period. Then we roll back to the second-to-last period, and calculate optimal play as a function of beliefs, taking into account the effect of second-to-last period actions on last-period beliefs, and hence on last-period play. We proceed this way back to the first period.
In the last period, indexed T, the B player knows that an X-type E player will certainly renege. Therefore, if B thinks the probability that a player is Y-type is PT, B's expected value from choosing L is 40PT -100(1 -PT) (for the parameters of experiments 3-5). (We assume risk-neutrality, additively separable utility, 5 One advantage of using this method is that when E's were Y-types, they quickly learned that paying back was a dominant strategy. They chose to pay back very quickly to signal their type, since X-types had to think about whether to renege and Y-types did not, so a slow response from E could tip off B's that E was an X-type. (This even happened in the experiments with P(Y) =0, even though there were no Y-types.) To prevent speed from signaling E's type, the experimenters "held" quick responses for a second or two before communicating them. and no time discounting in making these calculations; but we generalize for other risk tastes below.) The gain from lending exceeds the sure gain from not lending, 10, if and only if PT is greater than the "threshold" of 110/140. Note that this PT is E's reputation, a measure of what type of player E is thought to be.
In period T-1, an X-type E could renege and get 150, and another 10 in period T (since B would not lend to E in period T). Or E can play a mixed-strategy, choosing to pay back with probability ST-, and reneging with probability 1 -ST-,. E will want to choose ST_1 so that when B observes E'S pay-back in period T -1 and updates her beliefs about E, her updated posterior probability PT is above the threshold of 110/140. Then E's total expected earnings from periods T -1 and T are Intuitively, since these expected earnings are increasing in ST-,, E wants to choose ST-, as large as possible, provided ST_1 makes the posterior probability PT above B's period T threshold of 110/140. (More precisely, if the probability PT is exactly at its threshold, B will be indifferent between lending and not lending. B will choose a mixed-strategy probability which makes E indifferent between reneging and paying back, and E will choose a mixed-strategy probability which makes the posterior probability PT equal to its threshold.)
If B uses Bayes' rule to update probabilities, the posterior probability PT is given by PT-k > .786 (That is, since even X-type E 's are likely to pay back in early periods, B 's require less and less assurance that E is a Y-type to convince them to lend, so the threshold is lower.)
If the game begins with some commonly-known prior probability h that E is a Y-type, the sequential equilibrium is for B to lend and for E to pay back, as long as the prior h is above the threshold in (7). But as k gets smaller (the end draws near), the right-hand side of (7) grows, so h will eventually be less than .786k ?. At that point, the E player must then do something to enhance his reputation-that is, to increase B's posterior probability that E is a Y-type-or else B will refuse to lend in the remaining periods. In the period just before the inequality h > .786k" is violated, E begins playing mixed-strategies with probabilities of paying back given by (6).
Once mixed-strategy play begins, E's choice of ST This lending probability is optimal in every period where the posterior probability PT-k exactly equals B's threshold.
Sequential equilibria are usually not unique because theorists have some freedom in choosing what beliefs agents will hold after out-of-equilibrium moves. (Bayes' rule doesn't apply to out-of-equilibrium events, which have zero probability.) In the SE we describe, the only out-of-equilibrium moves to which Bayes' rule doesn't apply are reneges in the early periods (periods 1-3 in experiments 3-5, and periods 1-2 in experiments 6-8). Thus, to complete our SE we only need to specify what B's will think after they observe an early-period (out-ofequilibrium) renege. In deriving the SE above, we assumed that if B's observe an early-period renege they will believe E is an X-type, since reneging is a dominated strategy for Y-types.6
The parameters in our experiments were chosen so that the equilibrium makes testable implications about three kinds of probabilities: reneging, "following," and lending.
Reneging Probabilities
The graph in Figure 2a illustrates the equilibrium path of P(Y), for an X-type E player, for the parameters in experiments 3-5. (Figure 2b is an analogous illustration for experiments 6-8, and these predictions are summarized in Table  I .) In periods 1-3, the prior probability of 1/3 is above B's threshold; so B should always lend and an X-type E should always pay back. Period 4 is a crucial period, because X-type E's must begin playing mixed strategies to enhance their reputations, to make the probabilities PT-k meet larger and larger thresholds. For instance, in experiments 3-5 E should pay back with probability 6 We have not explored whether this belief satisfies the many criteria proposed for refining sequential equilibria (e.g., Grossman and Perry, 1986; and see Cho and Kreps, 1987 , for a criterion and a review). However, we shall consider the data for some guidance about what B's believe after an early-period renege. We can also rule out many implausible SE. like the one in which all E types renege in the early periods, B does not lend, and if B lends and E pays back, B thinks E is an X-type. B's latter belief is "inconsistent" in Grossman and Perry's (1986) sense (and probably can be ruled out by weaker criteria), since Y is one of the E types who prefers to pay back and B's belief should reflect that. Figure 2a , this is shown by a .81 probability on the branch leading to a higher P , and a .19 probability on the branch leading to P5 = 0.) Note that the mixed-strategy probabilities of payback get smaller and smaller, since the prior must be boosted more and more to reach each higher threshold. In the 8th and last period-if F makes it that far without ruining his reputation by reneging and sending P(Y) to 0-an X-type F will certainly renege; so in period 9 (i.e., after the sequence is over) P(Y) = 0. SE makes a nonobvious prediction about what will happen following a period with no loan. In a period where there is no loan the prior PT--k does not get revised at all (since E has no chance to either maintain or ruin his reputation). In periods 1-3, even if there is no loan the initial prior of 1/3 is still large enough, even unrevised, to exceed the threshold in the following period. Therefore, no loan in periods 1-3 should be followed by a loan in the next period.
However, if there is no loan in period 4 the prior of 1/3 does not get revised, but it is below the period 5 threshold. The missed opportunity to build reputation in period 4 means that B's should be unwilling to lend in period 5. No loan in period 4 (or in any subsequent period) should be followed by a string of no loans.
Thus, sequential equilibrium predicts a change in "following" probabilities (that is, the probability of no loan following no loan), from 0 to 1, in period 5 of experiments 3-5 and period 4 of experiments 6-8, as shown in Table I .
B's Lending Probabilities
SE has another nonobvious property: The payoffs for an X-type E do not affect E 's equilibrium play at all (assuming that the reneging payoff is less than the payoff from paying back). E's payoffs only affect the equilibrium through B's choice of lending probability in later periods.
As shown above, B's optimal lending probability is .643 in all periods where the probability PT-k is at the lending threshold. (Mixing strategies in this way is rational in the usual weak sense: B does not benefit from playing a mixed-strategy, but no pure strategy is better.)
Changes in E 's payoffs produce counter-intuitive changes in B 's lending probabilities. For instance, as E 's reneging payoff of 150 increases, one might think that indifferent B's would be less likely to lend. The opposite is true: As 150 gets large compared to E's payoffs from paying back and from getting no loan, the fraction M approaches 1-if they are indifferent, B 's are almost sure to lend to make E's indifferent between reneging now and reneging later. In this paper we do not test whether changing E's payoffs actually changes B's mixed-strategy play in the predicted way, but we can do so in further research.
One caveat: All these predictions about players' behavior depend on the assumption that others are acting in accord with SE, and predictions in later periods depend upon the assumption that an SE has been played in earlier periods. Thus, we must judge the accuracy of predictions about later-period play conditional on observed early-period play. If play is not consistent with SE in early periods, for instance, then later-period play might be inconsistent with the overall SE described above, but consistent with the SE prediction beginning off the equilibrium path.
Competing Hypotheses
In experimental economics we try to test hypotheses against serious alternative hypotheses, rather than against toothless null hypotheses, to make " strong inferences" (Platt, 1964). There are no alternative hypotheses as precise as SE, but we shall try to specify a few plausible reasons why results may depart from SE.
COMPETING THEORY # 1: Unraveling. If players ignore the possibility that E 's may be honest, then "unraveling" will result: B's will think that E will certainly renege in the 8th period, so E will then renege in the 7th period, and so forth. No loans will result. Persistent reputation-building (paying back by X-type E's) will falsify this theory. COMPETING THEORY #2: Social Norms. The cognitive or social force of traditions, or social norms, might freeze players into an equilibrium other than SE. (In economic terms, players may substitute the costs of thinking, or a taste for conformity to implicit group standards of behavior, for money gains.) As typically stated (e.g., Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985) , this social norms prediction is hard to falsify, but we suppose that a social norm implies consistency of behavior. For instance, the norm "never renege until period 4" might develop among E players. This theory can be falsified if we shift parameters so that SE predicts reneging in period 3 (as in experiments 6-8), and we then observe reneging in period 3. Within an experiment, we can judge the strength of norms by whether each series of decisions varies markedly from sequence to sequence, and by whether individual players exhibit the same patterns of behavior.
SE makes certain predictions which contradict squarely the notion that deterministic norms govern behavior. For instance, SE predicts that no loans will be followed by no loans only in later periods, but not in early periods. A conformity theory which predicts that B's do what others do, always following no loans with no loans, can be falsified if the SE prediction proves correct. COMPETING THEORY #5: Homemade Priors. The previous experimental work reviewed in the introductory section strongly suggests that subjects may have homemade priors about the information or tastes of others, along with the prior probabilities that we deliberately introduce into the experiment. For instance, even if we set the prior P(Y) equal to zero, players may act as if some fraction of the E's behave honestly, though we have not induced them to do so. (For instance, the homemade prior might be the percentage of E players who are so altruistic that they -will always pay back rather than renege.) If subjects do use a homemade prior that increases the effective P(Y), then reneging will begin later in the game than we predict; but once reneging has started, the amount of reneging will be the same as predicted.
Some kinds of homemade priors should not affect the game. For instance, suppose the subjects think some B's will be so altruistic (or irrational) that they always choose to lend (even after a renege reveals that E is an X-type). Unless this percentage is quite high (e.g., for experiments 3-5, around 36 per cent), it 7 For this simple game, risk attitudes can be easily summarized by defining the utility of the 10-franc N payoff as x. If x = 10, players are risk-neutral; x < 10 means players are risk-seeking; and x > 10 means players are risk-averse. The critical threshold then becomes (100 + x)/140, so if players are risk-averse and x > 10, this threshold is larger. If players are risk-seeking, the threshold is smaller. For E players' risk-tastes, let the parameter 60 = x, and the ratio M that determines B 's mixed-strategy lending is then (150 -x)/(150 -10). This ratio is lower if E's are risk-averse and higher if E's are risk-seeking.
8 Suppose play is on the equilibrium path, and call the threshold t. Then in period T -k -1, E chooses a mixed-strategy ST-k-1 to satisfy ST-k-1 = tT-k 1(1 tT-k)/tT-k(l -tT-k-1).
Differentiation shows that this expression is increasing in t, so if the thresholds are higher (lower) by risk-aversion (-seeking), then E's will pay back more (less) than predicted under risk-neutrality.
will not affect E's play at all.9 The reason is that as long as E's payoffs in any period are increasing in the mixed-strategy probability of paying back, E will choose that probability to be as large as possible (though constrained by the requirement that the posterior probability of honesty is above B's lending threshold). Unless the chance of a B always lending is high, E's payoffs will be increasing in the mixed-strategy probability, and the game is unaffected. (Keep in mind that B's " type" does not matter much because in each period a different B plays, so B's cannot build up reputation effects of their own.)
Note that competing theories #3-5 are only competing theories in a specialized sense. In each case, we have asked what happens if some perturbation of subjects' payoffs that we cannot entirely control-risk-tastes, interdependence in utilities, or homemade priors about others' utilities-actually comes into play, and we have worked out the SE for each perturbation. These competing SE's are not competing solution concepts, they are simply attempts to anticipate possible deviations between predicted SE and actual behavior, based on uncontrolled payoffs. If SE with homemade priors, or SE with risk-aversion, turns out to describe behavior well, then we can still take the data as supportive of SE as a descriptive solution concept, provided that the subjects' homemade beliefs or risk tastes are empirically systematic.
RESULTS
We conducted three experiments (numbered 3-5) with a prior P(Y) of .33, and three experiments (6-8) with a prior of .10. All raw data from these experiments are shown in Appendix A, in Tables A.1-A.6 (except for the orders in which the B players actually played in each sequence, which are available from the authors). There is evidence of reputation-building in all experiments. The majority of E players did not renege at the first opportunity in the first sequence they played.
The weakest requirement of SE in this game is that E's should not renege in early periods, and B's should not lend after observing a previous renege in that sequence. In the first 30 sequences or so, there were some violations of these minimal conditions, but the violations disappeared (with a few exceptions) as subjects gained experience. Since most authors discuss games with more than 8 periods when explaining reputation-building,'0 it is significant that we observe reputation-building in games with only 8 periods. (We also saw reputation-building in pilot experiments with 6 periods.) Table I summarizes the predictions of SE about reneging, lending, and following probabilities, in the two sets of experiments. We test these predictions with 9 Take the period T-1 play as illustrative. Suppose the chance of a perfectly altruistic B is K. Then E chooses ST_1 to maximize ST1(60 + 150) + (1 -STl)(150 + 150K+ 10(l -K)). This reduces to 160 + 140K + ST-1(50 -140K). The expression in parentheses is only negative, thereby changing E's optimal choice, if K> 50/140 (around .36). This threshold for K goes down as the game rolls back to the beginning, but for the parameters we have worked through it never gets so low that we expect E's to renege earlier than predicted by SE. 10 E.g., Selten (1978, p. 153) hints that games with 2-4 periods will have no reputation-building, but 20-period games will. cross-sectional data from each experiment, and with data pooled across experiments.
For example, to estimate the reneging probability P( RT k I no previous R), we counted the fraction of times in each round T -k that X-type E subjects who had not reneged earlier in that sequence were given a loan and then reneged.11 (We excluded periods in which E's had reneged earlier in the sequence because late-period lending in these sequences could be disequilibrium errors.)
In each of the experiments we divided the sample of 8-period sequences into thirds, and analyzed each third separately. (In experiment 3, for instance, we analyzed sequences 1-30, 31-60, and 61-90 separately.) This simple way of dividing the data helps distinguish the period of learning and disequilibrium, which mostly occurs in the first third of the experiment, from equilibrium behavior exhibited in the last two thirds of the experiment. We often pooled data from the second and third thirds of the sequences in each experiment, since these thirds were generally quite similar. (Indeed, that similarity is our assurance that we are observing equilibrium behavior.)
We shall discuss in turn each of the three kinds of probabilistic predictions: Reneging, lending, and following.
Reneging Probabilities
Sequential equilibrium predicts that the mixed-strategy probability of an X-type E reneging, P( R TI no previous R) rises monotonically, but erratically, across rounds (recall Table I Because data from replications of the same experiment were very similar, we pooled data to get more statistical power in estimating the reneging probabilities. Tables II and III If we take the mixed-strategy probability predicted by SE to be a null hypothesis about a binomial proportion, we can test that hypothesis with the standard normal approximation to the binomial distribution.12 These test statis-11 Note that the number of informative observations could be quite low in later periods, since it was not often that a dishonest E made it to a late period without having reneged, and then got a loan. This is the primary reason why we ran many repetitions of a short game, rather than a longer game with few repetitions.
12 That is, we calculate standard errors as (p (1 -p)/n )1/2, where p is the probability predicted by SE and n is the sample size for a particular round. Then the test statistic, p minus the estimated p divided by the standard error, is normally distributed around zero with variance of one if the null hypothesis is true. If the hypothesized proportion is zero or one, we can estimate the standard error using the observed proportion. We also checked that observations were independent, because tests of binomial proportions rely on the assumption of independence. The choices in a given round were remarkably independent across sequences-for instance, choices in the 6th round when a loan was made to an X-type E were approximately uncorrelated from sequence to sequence, perhaps because a different B subject was randomly chosen to play in the 6th round in each sequence. The actual proportions of reneging were generally lower than the SE predictions (so the z-scores are almost always positive), significantly so in early rounds 3-5. (The SE predictions in rounds 6 and 7 are more accurate, but the small samples in those later rounds don't give us much power to distinguish between a true null hypothesis and altemative hypotheses close to SE.)
The hypothesis tests suggest that the deviations between SE and the data are much too large to be due to chance, except in round 7 from both sets of experiments. However, the estimated proportions of reneging do rise almost monotonically: Note from Figures 3 and 4 that the upper bound of each round's confidence interval generally is below (or almost below) the lower bound of the next round's confidence interval.
Lending Probabilities
The estimates of B's lending probabilities, P(LTI no NT,1 no previous R) are shown in Tables IV-V, for data pooled across experiments 3-5 and experiments 6-8. Generally, the probabilities are very close to one (B's always lend) in early rounds, and less than one in later rounds. In experiments 3-5 (Table IV) we see a drop in the actual proportion of lending, from .913 to .721, between periods 4 and 5 where SE predicts a drop from 1.00 to .643.13 (Note that this drop is absent in the first third of the sequences-the change between rounds 4 and 5 is from .894 to .897-suggesting that it takes subjects a little while to learn to begin using mixed strategies in round 5.) Testing the hypothesis that p = .643 for each of 13A large-sample normally-approximated z-test for the difference in proportions between rounds 4 and 5 yields z = 5.26, 1.16, and 1.80 for experiments 3-5 separately and z = 6.00 for the last two thirds of the sequences pooled across experiments. (Table IV) barely consistent with the SE prediction (and far off in round 7). Testing for the data from rounds 5-8 combined (in the second line of the table), we see very close convergence, with an estimated proportion of .616 (and with a sample large enough to convince us that the accuracy of the .643 prediction is probably not due to chance). The data from experiments 6-8 in Table V are less supportive of SE. We do not see the sharp drop from rounds 3 to 4 as predicted (though the drop in last two-thirds data, pooled, is statistically significant'4), but there is a monotonic drop in B's propensity to lend in every round from rounds 4 through 8. (And note that z-scores for the hypothesis p = .643 tested on each round's data separately are not far from zero in rounds 6-8, but are very far off in rounds 4-5, and for the pooled data.)
B's Following Probabilities
SE predicts the probability of no loan following a no loan in the previous period will change from 0 to 1 between rounds 4 and 5 in experiments 3-5, and between rounds 3 and 4 in experiments 6-8. (In general, the last round with zero following probability is the round in which E begins playing mixed-strategies.)
Tables VI-VII show the data from experiments 3-5 and 6-8 (with data from the last two thirds of each experiment pooled because samples were very small). We do see changes in the following probability as predicted, but the samples are too small to permit powerful tests. Pooling rounds with the same predicted following probability (2-4 and 5-8 in Table VI ; 2-3 and 4-8 in Table VII ) and testing for differences in proportions yields z = 5.42 for experiments 3-5. The small samples in experiments 6-8 make the z-test inappropriate, but the observed probabilities-0/7 and 114/129-are consistent with the following-probability predictions of SE.
Competing Theories
The data are generally consistent with the qualitative predictions of SE about the proportions of reneging, lending, and following. The data cannot distinguish subtle differences between perfect or sequential equilibria15 and theories of heuristic or boundedly rational play which approximate perfect equilibrium, but they can rule out many simple theories. We think the data are best taken as an antidote to the argument that SE couldn't possibly describe behavior because it is too complicated. Since the precise numerical predictions of SE are often rejected, especially in the consistent under-reneging of E players, we now consider whether competing theories can explain the systematic deviations between SE and actual behavior.
Clearly, competing theory #1 (unraveling) is falsified. (Below, we report experiments with P(Y) = 0 in which unraveling is the theoretical prediction of perfect and sequential equilibrium, but it is falsified there also.)
Competing theory #2 (social norms) is harder to falsify. If social norm theories imply consistency between players, they are falsified by the systematic variations in players' strategies (see Tables XIII-XIV for data from experiment  7) . Players do not seem to obey group norms and act similarly. If social norm theories imply consistency across sequences, they are contradicted by the chronic variation across sequences, which is easily seen from the raw data in Appendix A. Any norm theory which suggests different subjects will all do the same thing in a particular period cannot stand up to the data. Theories like "lend until period 8," "never renege until period 6," etc., are clearly false.
Theories which predict the same norms will arise in different experiments, perhaps because of focal points in the game structure, are ruled out by the responsiveness of the data to parameter shifts. For instance, the theory that people in experiments 3-5 obey the norm "don't renege until halfway through the game (period 4)" is falsified by reneging in period 3 of experiments 6-8 (where SE predicts reneging). Any norm theories which are invariant to the proportion of (Y) players are similarly falsified by comparing experiments 3-5 and 6-8. The theory that B players conform whenever other players choose no loan before them is falsified by the change in following probabilities between periods 4-5 (experiments 3-5) and periods 3-4 (experiments 6-8)-in early periods, B's do not conform.
In fairness, we note that these experiments are not very conducive to the development of norms because players cannot communicate, deviance cannot be 15A more demanding test would involve changing E's payoffs, or any other parameters which should produce large changes according to competing theories and small changes according to SE. We shall do this in future work, and also gather probability judgments from players during the game, to test whether strategies and beliefs are in equilibrium as SE predicts. punished, and the experiments do not last very long. However, norms or conformity pressures might explain some of the disequilibrium behavior in early sequences of an experiment, like the tendency for B players to lend even after the E player reneged on a loan earlier in the same sequence.
The basic predictions of SE seem correct-E's renege increasingly toward the end, B's lend sporadically in late periods-but the observed proportions of reneging and lending do not match the proportions predicted by SE. Since competing theories # 3-5-risk-tastes, altruism or envy, and homemade priors-predict some SE, but with probabilities different than those we have specified, these competing theories might help explain the deviations from SE.
The homemade pnor theory (#5) predicts that reneging (and mixed-strategy lending) will begin later than we predict, but once reneging begins, the proportions of reneging and lending should be as predicted. By contrast, the risk-tastes ( #4) and altruism or envy (# 5) theories predict that reneging will start later, and E's will over-renege (for altruism or risk-seeking); or reneging will start earlier, and E's will under-renege (for envy or risk-aversion). The homemade prior theory has no effect on B's probability of lending, but the other theories predict more lending (risk-seeking or envy) or less lending (risk-aversion or altruism).
The stylized facts seem to be that E's start to renege later, and then under-renege, while B's lend about the correct amount of the time (perhaps over-lending in experiments 6-8). None of the competing theories explains these stylized facts entirely well, but after observing experiments 3-8 we realized that the homemade prior theory could explain many of the facts.16 This theory has the distinct advantage of predicting the same amount of B lending as SE predicts. Since the lending predictions seemed accurate, we fit the homemade prior theory to the experiment 3-8 data, and ran more experiments (described below) to see how well the fitted theory could predict. We note also that the homemade prior theory is supported by the earlier empirical work which finds reputation formation where no incomplete information has been explicitly introduced, as in frequent cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
The Homemade Prior Theory, Revisited and Jeopardized
We focus on a particular homemade prior theory: subjects think some proportion of the X-type E's will always pay back (like Y-types). We first estimated this proportion from the data on experiments 3-5 and 6-8, then we ran further experiments to test whether the theory that subjects play an SE with the same honesty proportion we measured in experiments 6-8.
The total prior P(Y) will consist of the prior we created (either .33 or .10), along with some fraction q of the proportion 1 -P(Y) of X-type E's, who behave like Y-types despite our efforts to induce X-type preferences. We can try to estimate this total prior (then calculate q from the estimated total) by seeing in which period E's begin reneging with any frequency.
Estimating the Homemade Prior in Experiments 3-8
According to SE, E's should begin reneging in the period just before the threshold exceeds the prior. For instance, in experiments 3-5, there is little reneging (i.e., less than 5 per cent, with no apparent upward trend) until period 5, when X-type E's reneged 13.8 per cent of the time (Table II) . The thresholds in periods 5 and 6 are .381 and .485, respectively. Thus, we estimate the total prior to be between .381 and .485, but we can be even more precise. If the X-type E's are playing optimally, then their reneging probability in period S is chosen to make the posterior P(Y) in period 6 equal to the threshold of .485. (However, note that the observed fraction of reneging, .138, is an average of zero reneging by the q proportion of X-types who behave like Y's, and a proportion of reneging .138/(1 -q) by the 1 -q proportion of X-types.) Thus, using Bayes' rule and assuming optimality, we can infer that the total prior P(Y) satisfies (10)
.485=
.*P(y) 1*P(Y) + I -(I -P(Y))
Since P(Y) = 1/3 + 2q/3 by assumption, solving (10) for q yields q = .161.
The calculation for experiments 6-8 works the same way. Since E's reneged only 7.7 per cent of the time in period 4 (Table III) , and 15.4 per cent of the time in period 5, we take period 5 to be the first reneging period. The threshold in period 6 is .296, so the analogous condition to (10) for the total prior P(Y) is (11)
.296= 1*P(y)
1*P(Y) + I1 -I }(I -P(Y))
Substituting P(Y)= .1 + .9q and solving for q yields q = .172. This is quite close to the estimate of q = .161 from experiments 3-5, which used different subjects and different parameters.
Testing the Homemade Prior Theory
Since the homemade prior appears to have some empirical regularity, we ran two experiments with an initial prior P(Y) = 0, to test the theory that subjects act as if P(Y) is around .17. (Zero-prior experiments can also falsify the unraveling theory, and create some continuity between our work and the large number of earlier experiments with no controlled incomplete information.) Experiments 9-10 were run exactly like experiments 3-8, except that we used no bingo cage to randomly determine whether E was an X-type or a Y-type, and we changed one parameter as a test of robustness (B's reneging payoff was -75, not -50 or -100 as in earlier experiments). The raw data are shown in Appendix A, Tables A.7-A.8, and summary statistics are provided in Tables VIII-XII. Using a (completely homemade) prior P(Y) of .17, we predict that reneging should start in period 3. Reneging predictions for all periods are given in Tables VIII-X. The two experiments were very different. In experiment 9, subjects were very slow to learn. There were many sequences, until very late in the experiment, in which E reneged in an early period, then B made a loan and E reneged again (in one cases, five times in a single sequence). In the final third of the sequences, behavior came slightly close to SE with the homemade prior, except that E's did not renege nearly as much as predicted until periods 7 and 8 (see Table VIII ). Lending probabilities did not drop much from periods 3 to 4 (as SE predicts; see Table XI) , and following probabilities were not especially accurate either (Table  XII) .
Experiment 10 was entirely the opposite: Subjects learned to build reputation almost immediately, and the frequencies of reneging (Table IX) , were close to predicted in almost every period. Lending, when pooled with experiment 9, did drop between period 3 and period 4 (Table XI) , and aggregate late-period lending was .670, close to the prediction of .643. Following jumped somewhat from period 3 to period 4, but the samples are small (Table XII) .
Experiment 9 could probably be excluded from the analysis, because two B subjects said (in written comments) they thought the E choices were made randomly or by the experimenters, but we shall pool it with experiment 10, and analyze the pooled results.17 The pooled results from the last two-thirds of sequences (Table X) When we look back at experiments 3-5 and 6-8 with the belief that subjects used a homemade prior of 17 per cent, along with the controlled prior, some of the deviations between SE and observed behavior can be explained. With a homemade prior of 17 per cent reneging should only start in period 5 for both sets of experiments, so the only reneging probabilities that we expect to be correct are those in periods 6-8. In these periods, the predictions are generally quite accurate (although period 6 reneging is a little low, and the samples are small). This reanalysis, along with the accuracy of the prediction that B's lend with probability .643, leads us to conclude that SE, with a homemade prior of 17 per cent, describes subjects' aggregate behavior reasonably well.
Overarching Reputation-Building Is Suboptimal
One potential problem with our design is that the E player in one sequence has a 1/3 chance of playing the next sequence, and the B players know this. This gives E players some incentive to develop a reputation which arches over 17 Plott (1986) gives a rationale for rejecting such data, and some examples. Experiments are joint tests of whether controls worked ("internal validity"), and whether theories are true. If controls did not work-in our case, some experiment 9 subjects thought they were playing against experimenters, or random devices-then we can legitimately exclude the data. different sequences, but we now show that this incentive is too small to make reputation-building across sequences optimal, so it cannot explain the homemade prior we observe.
Denote the equilibrium expected value to E of a game which begins with prior h by V(h, X) if E plays like an X, and V(h, Y) if E plays like a Y. The crucial question is whether it pays for an X-type E to pay back in the 8th period of the current game and continue to play honestly (if he gets a chance) in sequences which follow immediately afterward, rather than renege and play like an X-type. We consider only the sequences which follow immediately afterward because we assume the other E's, if they are X's, are playing like X-types. Thus, with 3 E players it is not optimal to pay back in the 8th period, because there is not enough probability of playing the subsequent sequence(s), and even if the same E plays, the B's do not know that. (It is also not optimal with 2 E players, as in experiment 4, but the difference in payoffs is smaller.) These calculations assume that an E player who pays back in the 8th period does so alone. We do not know how to model the development of collusive group reputations, and they rarely occurred (perhaps because we restricted verbal communication between players). In future experiments, we shall dilute the incentive to form overarching reputations even further, by not allowing E's to play two sequences in a row. Then, only group reputations could form.
Individual Behavior and Self-Insight
The formal statistical analyses, and the reanalysis (and new experiments) to detect any homemade prior, suggest that SE predicts well; but there is much behavior that is not easily captured by summary statistics.
The behavior of subjects in our experiments provides some support for the usual defense of complicated theories in economics-people act "as if" they 18 This is another approximation, since another Y-type E might play between two sequences where the same honest-behaving E plays, thus maintaining the B's beliefs that the honest-behaving E is playing. However, this will happen rarely, especially in experiments 6-8, so our approximation is close. maximize, though they make no calculations. Our subjects knew no formal game theory, made almost no calculations, and were often puzzled or skeptical when we described the sequential equilibrium to them after the experiment. Yet their aggregate behavior is not badly described by SE. How? The "testimony" of subjects, the answers they gave to simple questions asked after the experiment, provides some clues. Most subjects described decision rules that were consistent with sequential equilibrium, but not nearly so elaborate. Said E3: "I was trying to disguise the fact that I was an X type, and waiting before I made a [renege] decision." Many other subjects talked about reputation in roundabout terms-as in "not killing the golden goose," or, "developing trust." (See Table XIII for actual reneging probabilities in experiment 7 for each E player.) Their self-reported decision rules were usually less sophisticated than their apparent behavior. Said B2: "The deciding factor, somehow seemed to be the round number... The farther along the rounds, the more likely I would choose [no loan]." The word "somehow" is telling: Like many other subjects, B2 seemed to use a near-optimal strategy without knowing why it was near-optimal.
One reason aggregate play could be close to SE, even if each individual subject was not exactly following SE, is that the choice of E player and the sequence of B players were randomly varied from sequence to sequence. Even if all players used pure strategies (like Bi: "If my round number was 6 or greater, I definitely picked [no loan]"), the random choice among such players using different pure strategies could look exactly like mixed-strategy play. (This argument is used to explain how animal populations can achieve intricate mixed-strategy equilibria, even though individual animals presumably play pure strategies. See, e.g., Dawkins, 1976, or Maynard-Smith, 1982.) Indeed, about half the players seemed to use simple cutoff strategies-pay back until period 4, lend until period 6, and so on-but their cutoffs varied (see the data on individual lending strategies in experiment 7, Table XIV ). For instance, B subjects 4, 5, and 7 always made loans in periods 5-8; Bi and B8 never did. But since the choice of which B subjects played in periods 5-8 varied, the result was that periods 5-8 loans were made 59 per cent of the time (cf. the SE prediction of .643). Period  BI  B2  B3  B4  B5  B6  B7 
CONCLUSION, METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We conclude that SE predicts reasonably well, given its complexity. However, formal statistical tests reject SE strongly for some periods of the game. Subjects failed to renege as early in the game, or as often, as predicted.
Because other predictions of SE about lending and following were fairly accurate, we sought a competing theory that could explain the observed underreneging without otherwise changing the predicted SE. One plausible competing theory is that subjects bring into the experiment a "homemade" prior belief that some subjects will not renege, even when we tried to induce a preference for reneging. This homemade prior theory is consistent with the large body of evidence that subjects in repeated games cooperate more often than predicted, including recent economics experiments showing reputation formation.
We estimated the homemade prior, q, from experiments 3-5 (q = .161) and experiments 6-8 (q = .172). We then ran two experiments (9-10) in which we did not induce preferences that would lead any subjects to not renege, and we made predictions assuming 17 per cent of the subjects would not renege. In these experiments the homemade prior is about .176. Thus, some of the descriptive failures of SE are diminished when we include the homemade incomplete information about preferences which subjects create themselves. The existence of this homemade prior is a failure of our experimental control, but we were able to estimate that homemade prior reliably from different experiments (using different subjects, and parameter changes).
The data suggest that people are reasonably good intuitive game players, though other evidence suggests people are poor intuitive statisticians, and are poor intuitive scientists-e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). Perhaps everyday life does not prepare people for the surprises of Bayes' rule, or to search for disconfirming data, but life does provide a lot of practice interacting with other people of unknown character. Still, SE requires Bayesian updating along with optimal strategy choice. It is interesting that subjects are apparently able to use Bayes' rule to approximate a sophisticated SE, while erring in simpler applications of Bayes' rule (e.g., Camerer, 1987) .
We draw one methodological lesson from our work. It takes time for subjects to learn in this experiment. In the first 30 sequences or so, which took about an hour, subjects invariably made mistakes. An experiment like ours which lasted only one hour (30 sequences) would yield very different conclusions about the descriptive accuracy of SE. Also, subjects need to observe several actual plays of the end of the game, before they can play optimally in early periods. (This tendency to learn the last period first is called the "swingback hypothesis" in research on asset markets, e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott, 1982). Experiments in which subjects play a long repeated game only once (as in most earlier game experiments) may misleadingly suggest that subjects play sub-optimally.
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Department of Decision
Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. [At this point, the experimenter pulls out a wad of money from an envelope, and hold it up so all the subjects could see the cash, to reinforce the reality of the monetary rewards.]
General Instructions
Each decision maker has been randomly assigned to be a member of the A group, or a member of the B group. Members of the A group have an "A" marked on their folders, along with a number (for example, A 2). Group A players will remain in this room (the "A room") during the experiment. Group B members have a "B" marked on their folders, and a number (for example, B3). Group B players will sit in a different room (the "B room") across the hall. [The experimenter then announces the number of the "B room"-e.g. Room 307.] One experimenter will be in each room, and the experimenters will communicate with each other by speaking and listening on walkie-talkies.
In this experiment, there will be several sequences of decision rounds. Each sequence consists of eight decision rounds. Each round is a choice by one A player, followed by a choice by a B player.
How Players are Selected
A single B player will be chosen before each sequence of rounds, to make choices in all eight rounds in that sequence. Which B player will be chosen in a specific sequence has been predetermined by a random selection process. For instance, if the number 1 is assigned to a sequence, then player BI is the player who will make all the choices in the eight rounds in that sequence.
In each sequence of rounds, each of the eight A players will make a choice in one of the decision rounds. Which player makes a choice in which round has been predetermined by a random number selection process. [In our pilot experiments we used another bingo cage to determine the ordering of A players. This proved to be very time consuming, so we predetermined the ordering before the experiment. After several sequences, subjects could see that the ordering appeared random, and they did not seem concerned that we had pre-ordered.] In this experiment, all earnings are in terms of "francs." Each franc is worth $0. XX [a specific number is given here, but not read aloud-instead, we say "some number"] to you. This number is your own private information and you are not to reveal it to anyone. At the end of the experiment, your francs will be converted to dollars and paid to you in cash. [The conversion rate can be considered as a balancing act. While you want to provide subjects with a large enough monetary incentive so they consider the experiment "worthwhile," you want to run as many experiments as possible, and thus don't want to waste your limited resources. One result of this is that it is always better to err on the low side. It is much easier to give subjects "bonuses" at the end of the experiment (e.g. -for filling out the questionnaires) than to try explaining to subjects why you want to only give them part of their earnings. Generally, the best method for determining a conversion rate is to calculate the subjects' expected value. For example, the expected value of the A players in experiments 3, 4, 5 was $15.48. This was derived by calculating the A players' expected value when the B player's type was X (and multiplying this by .667), when the B's player type was Y (and multiplying this by .333), adding these totals together, then multiplying by the expected number of sequences, and dividing by 8. It should be noted that this expected value calculation is subject to the law of large numbers, and it is quite possible that some A players may receive bad random draws (e.g., have many of their scheduled periods late in the sequences). The B players' expected earnings were calculated in a parallel fashion. In this experiment it was important that both A and B players received similar earnings, because their exchange rates were necessarily different, to balance expected earnings. After the experiment, players of both types tend to ask each other how much they earned, and they get upset (harming goodwill and making future recruiting difficult) if their figures are systematically different. Our mean payoff for the experiments was $207.00, with a high payoff of $228.00, and a low payoff of $188.00.]
Choices in Each Decision
The possible earnings, which depend on the choices of the A and B players, are best shown in a diagram written on the blackboard [the experimenter would point to a diagram like Figure 1 in the text]. We shall explain them as well.
